Australian Property Prices

by Stubborn Mule on 30 June 2009

Property prices have always been a popular topic of conversation in Sydney, but the subject has become more contentious since the onslaught of the Global Financial Crisis. Views on prospects for Australian property prices range from the bleakly pessimistic to the wildly optimistic. Iconoclastic economist Dr Steve Keen is one of the more prominent pessimists and expects a fall in property prices of as much as 40%. At the other extreme, research firm BIS Shrapnel recently released forecasts that prices in capital cities will rise by almost 20% over the next three years. Of course, both sides have their critics. Macquarie Bank economist Rory Robertson is so convinced that Keen is wrong that he has offered a wager in which the loser will have to walk to the top of Mount Kosciusko wearing a t-shirt saying “I was hopelessly wrong on home prices! Ask me how”. Meanwhile, many dismiss the optimists as mere shills intent on talking up the market in the interests of their clients.

Faced with a debate like this, the only recourse for the Stubborn Mule is to look at the data. Fortunately, I have been able to get my hands on a rich set of data (and ideas) from University of New South Wales economist Dr Nigel Stapledon*. Stapledon has painstakingly assembled data on Australian property prices back to the 1880s and rental data back to the 1960s. This data underpins a detailed comparison of the Australian and US property markets in Stapledon’s forthcoming paper  “Housing and the Global Financial Crisis: US versus Australia” in The Economic and Labour Relations Review, Sydney. By comparison, the House Price Indexes published by Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) commence in 1989.

A first glance at Stapledon’s index of Sydney property prices does indeed appear to show a meteoric trajectory that would inflame the passions of the pessimists.

Sydney House Price Index

Sydney House Price Index

Of course, asset prices tend to exhibit exponential growth, so it is far better to look at historical prices on a logarithmic scale. This reveals a striking trend. The growth of Sydney property prices has been remarkably consistent at around 9% per annum over the last 50 years.

Sydney House Price Index (log scale)

Sydney Property Prices (log scale)

Prices for Australia overall show a similar trend, with average prices over the six major capital cities growing at an average of 8.6% per annum since 1955.

Six Capital Cities

Australian Property Prices

What these charts do not take into account is the effect of inflation. Indeed, inflation varied significantly over the last 50 years, so adjusting for the effect of inflation shows that the trend in Sydney house prices has not been so stable. Booms such as those from 1987-1989 and 1997-2003 are made very clear in the chart below. But it is also evident that  prices have failed to keep up with inflation over the last few years. Nevertheless, over the last 50 years, Sydney house prices have appreciated an average of 3.1% over inflation and that is before taking rental income into account.

Sydney House Price Index (inflation adjusted)

Sydney Prices (inflation adjusted)

One difficulty with long-run property price data is that fact that observations are typically based on median house prices, which does not take into account changes in the quality of houses. The median house in 2009 may be “better” than the median house in 1955 and changes in price may reflect this change in quality as well as price appreciation. Stapledon has attempted to take this into account by constructing an index for Australian house prices (six capital cities) that is adjusted for both inflation and standardised to “constant quality”. The trend in real prices, adjusted for quality over the period 1955-2009 has been an increase of 2.1% per annum over inflation. This compares to an increase of 2.7% per annum over inflation without adjusting for quality. So, at a national level, quality changes overstate the trend growth rate by 0.7%. While Stapledon has not constructed a quality-adjusted index for Sydney, assuming that the national trend applied would lead to the conclusion that Sydney house prices have a trend growth rate of 2.4% over inflation.

Six Capital Cities (quality adjusted)Australian Prices (quality and inflation adjusted)

Interesting though this historical exploration may be, the question we would like answered is where prices may head in the future.

One approach to the problem is to assume that growth in property values in real terms may change in the short term, but over the long term will revert to a long term trend. Enthusiasts of trend following may see some significance in the fact that Australian prices still appear to be above the longer run trend, while Sydney prices have already fallen below trend. Of course, depending on the time period used to determine the trend, very different conclusions may be reached. If I were to base the trend on the full history from the 1880s, the last 50 years would appear to be well above trend.

Another popular approach is to consider housing affordability. This approach either looks at ratios of house prices to income or ratios of housing servicing costs (whether interest or rent) to income. The assumption is that these ratios should be stable over time and if increases in house prices result in reduced affordability this indicates the prices can be expected to fall in the future. Stapledon is critical of this approach, arguing that:

while income is expected to be a major influence on prices, there is no theoretical reason for any fixed relationship between prices and income or between rents and income

Over time, people may change their priorities and place a greater or lesser importance on housing and, as a result, be prepared to spend a larger or smaller proportion of their income on housing. Stapledon argues that a better approach is to examine rental yield, which is the ratio of rents to prices. Since the property prices can be expected to keep pace with inflation (and, in fact, outpace inflation), rental yields should be comparable to real yields (i.e. yields over and above inflation) on other asset classes. The easiest real yields to observe are those of inflation-linked Government bonds.  The Reserve Bank of Australia publishes historical data for inflation-linked real yields back to the late 1980s. The chart below compares these Government bond real yields to Stapledon’s history of rental yields. While the correlation is not perfect, both rental yields and real yields show a downward trend from the late 1980s/early 1990s which has only recently begun to reverse. Since rents have not fallen over this period, this provides an explanation for the strong growth in property prices over that period.

Rental Yields

Australian Rents and Inflation-Linked Bonds

So what could this approach tell us about property prices? Rental yields have already risen further than bond real yields, but certainly could go higher. What this means for prices does also depend on where rents themselves may be headed. The chart below shows the contribution of rents to consumer price inflation as published by the ABS. While the rate of growth in rents has slowed, history would suggest that rents are unlikely to go backwards. A cautious, but not overly pessimistic forecast could see rental increases falling to an annualised rate of 1% while rental yields could climb back to 4%. The combined effect would be a fall of 12%. Since prices have already fallen by 7% over the year to the end of March 2009, this would amount to a fall of almost 20%.

Rent CPI

Rent Inflation (Quarterly)

This is certainly a significant drop, but still half the fall that Keen expects to see.  For prices to fall by 40%, even assuming rents remain unchanged rather than growing by 1%, it would be necessary for real yields to rise to 5.8%, which exceeds the record level since 1960 of 5.4%. On this basis, I find it hard to be as pessimistic as Keen. Indeed, the latest data from RP Data-Rismark International suggests that prices are once again on the rise. The next ABS release is a little over a month away, so it will be interesting to see whether they see the same recovery.

The relationship between rental yields and real yields is an interesting one, but ultimately does not provide definitive predictions, but rather an indication of a range of outcomes that would be precedented historically. Of course, as Nassim Taleb has emphasised, unprecedented “black swans” can occur so history does not allow us to rule out more extreme events. Furthermore, nothing here addresses the question why prices in the US have fallen so dramatically and yet Australian prices could suffer far milder falls. That is the primary focus of Stapledon’s paper and is a topic I may return to in a future post, but this one is long enough already!

UPDATE: In this post I noted that the historical data shows a marked shift in behaviour from the mid-1950s without providing any explanation as to the cause of this shift. Needless to say this is a subject Stapledon has given some serious consideration, and I will quote from his doctorate, “Long term housing prices in Australia and some economic perspectives”:

From a longer term view, a key observation is the clear shift in direction in house prices and rents from circa the mid 1950s. House prices, in particular, jumped significantly, best illustrated by the rise in the price to income ratio from about one: one to about 4:1 in the 2000s. Looking at demand and supply variables…indicates that this shift in direction cannot be adequately explained in terms of the demand variables of income and household growth. Supply side factors appear to be more crucial and there is a substantial literature emerging in the US emphasising the importance of supply side variables and specifically the propensity to regulate to constrain supply. The evidence presented in this thesis of the lift in the cost of fringe land in the major urban areas provides prima facie evidence that supply factors have been a significant factor explaining the upward trajectory in house prices in Australia since the mid 1950s.

* I would like to thank Dr Stapledon for generously making his data available to me.

UPDATE: finally, I have published the post on why I don’t think Australia’s property market will experience the same fate as the US market.

http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/unsworks:1435

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{ 20 comments… read them below or add one }

1 Danny Yee 30 June 2009 at 7:25 pm

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Keen's argument for a dramatic drop in house prices in Australia is the same as his argument for (and explanation of) the house price drop in the US and UK and Spain and Ireland - excessive debt levels. The availability of credit is absolutely critical to maintaining house prices, as a majority of both owner-occupiers and investors borrow at high LVRs to buy property. So a reduction in the availability of credit could conceivably produce a crash even if affordability (prices or repayments in relation to incomes) wasn't also at record lows. He doesn't focus narrowly on housing - he sees that as one aspect of the debt bubble - but the most focused comment of his on housing prices is http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/2009/04/06/steve-keens-debtwatch-no-33-april-2009-lies-damned-lies-a... ...

2 stubbornmule 30 June 2009 at 8:02 pm

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@Danny: you are right that I have not addressed the issue of the credit bubble, which is the thrust of Keen's argument rather than the affordability angle. Part of an analysis of the similarities or differences between Australia and the US has to address this question. Indeed, I would attribute the decline in real yields and rental yields to the credit bubble, at least in part, so it is not surprising to see them backing up. So, until I tackle that broader topic, what I can say is that if Keen is right, it would almost certainly lead to an unprecedented move in rental yields. Of course, that in itself does not prove anything as one could easily counter that the burst of an unprecedented bubble can have unprecedented results! Anyway, now I'll re-read that piece by Keen (I think I read it... ...

3 Calum Coburn 30 June 2009 at 11:40 pm

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Please share what assumed rate of inflation you’ve used. If CPI, then your figures will be under the real inflation rate.

4 Paul Heath 1 July 2009 at 8:36 pm

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Great post Mr Mule. Has your data mining on property come across any data relevant to the changes in growth in supply of housing over time. Often I hear references to limited supply of new housing as an explanation of house prices. There seems to be two likely sources of new housing supply. New zonings of land that allows land previously unable to used for housing to be used for housing and changes to rules that allow more dwellings than previously allowed on existing land zoned for housing. In theory both sources of new supply should be measurable. Greenfield zonings usually specify restrictions that result in a reasonably certain number of potential dwellings and the same could be said for changes to zonings of existing residential land (for example 3 suburban blocks re-zoned for... ...

5 billy 4 July 2009 at 12:04 am

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Im a bit baffled that Sydney prices can rise at 9% pa or 3.1%pa accounting for inflation.
Has Sydney not come across the Herengracht Index? if he has he certainly has no respect for it!

Obviously harder to work out but I feel equally enlightning would be the annualised growth rate in Sydney prices between 1880-1960. Do these show a 9% pa ?

Also when the UK had big property price drops of around 30% (and reposessions) in 1988-1996 did Sydney experience similar falls and “blood on the streets”?

6 Mike Beggs 5 July 2009 at 6:25 pm

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Yeah, great post Mr. Mule. I’m also really interested in the break in the 1950s. Guess I’ll have to read Stapledon’s thesis, but one other demand-side possibility springs to mind – a jump in the availability of credit to households. In my own thesis I look at the great leap in consumer credit around that time but unfortunately I haven’t looked at housing finance. But the 1950s were a time of major financial innovation, both state and private, and it could be a possibility. At the time, savings banks were huge and forced by regulation to hold a large proportion of their assets in housing loans.

7 stubbornmule 5 July 2009 at 6:58 pm

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@billy: The Herrengracht index certainly makes for a striking contrast to the behaviour of Sydney's prices. Stapledon makes the following observation on that subject: The broad picture that his time series paints is one of prices essentially showing no trend for three centuries, with cycles related to the economic events. Against that long term perspective the post 1970 rise in house prices in Holland stands out. But one city is probably not convincing. Moreover, there was clearly a structural shift in Australian prices (as indeed elsewhere around the world) sometime in the 1950s. As Mike Beggs observes in his comments, this was a time of significant change in the world of finance. So, Sydney's prices since then have behaved differently not only to the long run Herrengracht prices but to S... ...

8 billy 5 July 2009 at 8:53 pm

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Thanks for your reply to the late 1980s early 1990s.Sydney House prices. They certainly flatten for around 10 years but nothing like the UK graph for the same time. looking at the sydney prices (inflation adjusted) graph: Now what is it that causes such a massive spike in house prices in the mid 1950s? that appears to see no end? Granted prices spike in approx 1880-1890 but look where they end up in 1900 then there are around 3 spikes in prices from then till the mid 1950s but each boom has a bust or recorrection which gives us a pretty flat line overall for 70 years. then post 1955 we have 4 j shaped curves that just keep going skyward. However where does the trend line fall if you include the large peak caused by the land boom in the 1890s. If we disregard the "no... ...

9 stubbornmule 14 July 2009 at 9:54 am

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@Calum: The inflation adjustment is done using CPI. I know that there are plenty of challenges in constructing consumer price indices, but is there a specific concern you have with the ABS methodology for CPI? If CPI does indeed understate inflation, then the real growth rate of Australian property prices would be even lower!

10 Iris 16 July 2009 at 5:45 pm

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Hi Mule

Great post. Actually, the housing price has been rebound from the bottom of last year. It was said the power of enormous government stimulus packages. Does this mean assest fueling rather than real growth? or there will be another bubble (bonds or credit card) crisis next round?

11 stubbornmule 16 July 2009 at 10:00 pm

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@Iris: I saw the RisMark property data bounce up. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the Australian Bureau of Statistics data follows that pattern. We’ll know soon enough: they’ll be releasing the June figures in less than three weeks.

12 Danny Yee 16 July 2009 at 11:01 pm

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I think it’s gone beyond “very likely” that all developed countries will experience significant deleveraging. Even in Australia, corporate deleveraging is progressing rapidly. The outright failures of companies such as Babcock&Brown, Allco Finance Group, Timbercorp, Great Southern, Storm Financial, etc. are the extreme examples. Then there are the massive equity raisings by the banks, property trusts, and other companies trying to reduce debt levels. And infrastructure and property trusts are trying to sell assets. Commercial property is in big trouble. All that’s left standing is Australian (and maybe some Canadian) residential property. (And even there, it’s worth taking a glance at Mosman or the Sunshine Coast.) And I just don’t see how t... ...

13 Kevin 17 July 2009 at 2:54 pm

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An interesting set of data. I raise the following issues for your consideration. In the period 1998 to 2004 when house prices surged in Adelaide, analysts such as BIS Schrapnel consistently released predictions that prices would remain steady. When challenged on their logic, one analyst said it was a simple matter of matching stock to demand and given there were no population pressures in SA, prices would be stable. But the factor that they missed was a social one, not an economic one. The extra buyers in the market were young single females who, rather than wait for Mr Right, craved their own financial independence. There was also the increase in single person households courtesy of relationship breakdowns. So the anecdotal data from agents in the market picked up what the economists cou... ...

14 billy 17 July 2009 at 9:17 pm

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kevin, On paper it may look like your parents house costing $6000 on an annual income of $1500 seems to be "dearer" to finance than a dual income say $40k + $25k couple buying it today at $270K. But today as you have said everybody wants it now. So dont forget that todays couple will run 2 cars, go out on the town regularly, buy all the mod cons, no make do and mend here. There spending will be more than likely all of their income. They probably dont grow their own veggies ( today heard that produce prices have inflated at 4% pa from 1993). So take everything into account and I would reckon that the single income earner in the 1950s had the same if not more discretionary spending than today. The only difference as you said happened in 2004 is that the banks throw more at yo... ...

15 Sean 19 July 2009 at 1:15 pm

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To address some points: Steve Keen argues that we have seen 40-50 years of continual leveraging which is culminating in a 'catastrophic event' rivalling the Great Depression. Hence that explains the rises since the 1950s somewhat -- the new use of credit since that time. Others argue that new credit products are simply an economic enabler that have no bearing on inflated property prices or any other form of inflation for that matter, that 'credit is good' because it allows people to achieve things that they otherwise couldn't by borrowing against the future -- their earnings future. The LVR rate averages to something like 65% only because of more cautious lending by the banks *in the past*, and lower house prices allowing for easier repayments *in the past*. Current crazy rates of... ...

16 Sean 19 July 2009 at 1:32 pm

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Note also that new house prices have crept up lately due to cost-shifting by councils and state govts onto developers of new subdivisions, which of course goes onto the asking price of the houses. In the past, new infrastructure like power and sewerage and phone lines and road construction and parks and nature strips and lighting etc used to be borne by the entire community through general tax revenue. Now it has been shifted in recent years to the developer on a 'user pays' basis, new houses on the fringe etc have an extra fillip in their prices that wasn't there in previous years -- hence, house prices in relation to infrastructure are not a closed system but an open system -- cost-shifting can occur in the land cost base due to adjustments by govt in their contribution. This would th... ...

17 debtland 19 July 2009 at 2:53 pm

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With RE prices at say 7 times annual income versus 3.5 times (long term average), property is overpriced in Aus. http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/hsaf_ctte/report/b01.htm Executive Summary - The housing affordability problem Here are some possible reasons. If the community of Aus decides that having a nation of home owners is preferable to a nation of renters, then these factors will need to be addressed: ABS: does not include the land component of housing in its calculation of the CPI. Solution is to include land inflation in CPI calculations. RBA: uses the ABS data with diminished inflation due to not including the rapid rise in the cost of land. Result is that its 3-4% inflation range is an illusion. Other effects include the real inflation (about 12% per year if land wa... ...

18 stubbornmule 19 July 2009 at 11:32 pm

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Sean: thanks to the pointer to the discussion forum. I see there is now a thread discussing this blog post. I haven't got through all of it yet, but it certainly seems to be an animated discussion. I certainly agree with you that LVRs are an important consideration in assessing the potential risk of major price collapse. I don't suppose you have come across any Australian LVR data on the forum or elsewhere? Also, your point about attempts for people to "hang in there" rather than crystallize losses on an investment is an important one. This is a significant factor in property market dynamics. It is a side effect two apartments in the same block not being quite as equivalent as, say, two BHP shares. You can certainly argue that this means observed property prices are not "real", and I would... ...

19 xoc 22 July 2009 at 5:54 am

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House prices have a few fundamentally important factors. The physical supply, the potential demand, and crucially, the perceived value. Physical supply is ever more limited in a way because they aint making any more land close to the CBDs. Potential demand is a function of population, demographics, economic prosperity, employment and interest rates. Perceived value is a tricky one – housing becomes more and more valued until the bubble bursts, and then its necessary for clear fundamentals to emerge before buyers are prepared to pay ever growing prices again. The clearest fundamental is when rents are more expensive than mortgage payments.

20 Rob 21 February 2010 at 7:46 pm

[+]

It is simple maths people... You cant defy the laws of gravity forever!!!! 3% above inflation for 100 years means that in 100 years house prices will be about 19 times higher than they are now in real terms. That is a $500,000 house renting for $500 per week will be 9.5 million and only renting for $500 per week. Logic people please!!!!! If you stretch your arguments out over a longer time frame, you realise how ridiculous they are!!!! Property has gone up at the rate above inflation for 2 main reasons. 1. Easy credit. There is only so much the average person on $65,000 per year can afford in rent and interest payments. If you think that the average person will be able to afford a $9.5 million dollar mortgage with a $40,000 deposit in 100 years then property prices will c... ...

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